

Two studies on the internal syntax of complex names

Paolo Acquaviva

University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland <paolo.acquaviva@ucd.ie>

Proper names can be structurally complex. A particular case of complexity involves names combined with nouns, where the latter are interpreted transparently and compositionally. Two such cases are described and analyzed in detail: the types *general Smith* and *Felix the cat*, compared with their Italian counterparts (*il generale Bianchi* and *il gatto Felix*). The properties detailed in the descriptive part justify a structural analysis which not only takes into due account their syntactic and interpretive properties, but also explains the differences between the two constructions and the contrasts between English and Italian. The analysis crucially links the crosslinguistic alternation in the linear order of name and noun to the English-Romance contrast in the headedness of compounds, and so extends the explanation to compound names like *Mickey Mouse* (linearly contrasting with *Lupo Alberto*). More generally, the descriptive and explanatory results of these two case studies contribute to our understanding of a neglected aspect of the grammar of names: their interaction with common nouns.

KEYWORDS: names, nouns, compounds, kinds.

1. Introduction: Why complex names matter

Names are often internally complex: if *Jim* is simple, *Jimmy* is modified by an evaluative suffix, *James Smith* is simplex in a sense but complex in another, and *James ‘the ferret’ Smith* or *Mister James Smith* are complex in different ways. Among place-names, *London*, *Grantchester Meadows*, *Great Clarendon Street* are complex denominations, to which one must add names that obligatorily incorporate an article, like *the Breaches*. The variability in structural complexity becomes much greater, as can be imagined, as we consider different languages.

The semantic study of names has for a long time sidelined this variability in linguistic complexity. This was understandable, given that modern classic accounts which shaped later research, such as Kripke (1980) or Burge (1973), were couched in a philosophical tradition (see Mill 1843) which approached names as expressions with a particular interpretation, and was not directly interested in the linguistic properties of the expressions themselves, particularly in their internal grammatical structure. Semantically, it was especially the similarities and differences with definite descriptions which took centre stage, especially in the wake

of Burge's contribution. For this reason, when studies on the semantics of names have dealt with morphosyntactic aspects, they have focussed on the relation to appropriately interpreted noun phrases (see Longobardi 1994 and Elbourne 2005 for different interpretations of the role of the determiner). The fact that the name itself, as opposed of the phrase hosting it, may display various degrees of complexity, has not generally played a role, except for cases where names minimally include a definite article, as in *The Hague*. This was the case even though as early as in 1961 Quine's *Giorgione was so-called because of his name* (Quine 1961) had pointed to the interpretive relevance of a name's internal structure; in this case, to the semantic contribution of the augmentative suffix *-one*.

It is in the context of cross-linguistic and typological studies, by contrast, that the internal complexity of names themselves has come to the fore, as can recently attest the wide-ranging and detailed study of Van Langendoek (2007), as well as Anderson (2007), and more recently Helmbrecht (*forthcoming*), Ackermann & Schlücker (2017), and Schlücker & Ackermann (2017). Thanks to these studies we now know that languages differ considerably in how they express names, in some cases signalling the naming function by means of a specially marked non-nominal phrase (as in Helmbrecht's Hoočak Siouan example *haas-hóni-wi-ga* 'berry-seek-FEM-PROPER.NAME', where the last morpheme turns a clause into a name). More importantly, it is now established that names for persons, animals, place-names, and other objects follow distinct patterns and it would be a mistake to force the same grammatical format on them all. The various complexity patterns of names constitute an established fact, and its underlying laws are the object of an increasing body of research.

A welcome consequence of the state of the art quickly reviewed is that we can better appreciate how much remains to uncover. This does not apply only to the broad crosslinguistic landscape, but also to the best-studied languages which historically have provided the stock examples of names in semantic research. To illustrate this point with just one example, it is an important result of theoretical research since Longobardi (1994) that only some languages can prefix an 'expletive' article to names: the Italian and German (*lo*) *Stefano* and (*der*) *Stefan* thus contrast with the French and English (**le*) *Stéphane*, (**the*) *Stephen*. However, this type of optional article is systematically limited to personal names: for place-names, for names for animals, and for all non-animate objects, the article may be obligatory or impossible, but (almost) no such register-dependent optionality is attested.¹ The articulation of names into distinct subtypes clearly has grammatical consequences, yet formal syntactic and semantic analyses of names have disregarded this macroscopic fact.

This paper concerns a similar set of observations, revolving around the use of common nouns as part of complex names. The main object languages are abundantly studied, namely English and Italian; yet the constructions to be considered have played hardly any role in name research (the unpublished study by Moltmann 2015 is a notable exception, although it has a different empirical and theoretical emphasis). The choice of these two languages as main empirical focus is, if not arbitrary, certainly contingent. They reveal interesting contrasts, as we will see, which can be analyzed in detail thanks also to the existing rich literature; but their value lies in making possible conclusions based on directly comparable systems, without attempting generalization to typologically different systems, but concentrating on the relation between names and nouns (or noun-like elements) when they are part of the same nominal.²

We will see that in some sense, the properties emerging from constructions like *Bishop Smith*, *Daffy Duck*, or *Billy the Bear* place them halfway between common nouns and proper names (by itself, a revealing descriptive result). Yet neither being proper nor common are primitive linguistic notions: they are descriptive terms for particular types of uses defined by a precise cluster of characteristics. The purpose of the following study is then, first, that of describing in depth a neglected family of phenomena, in a way that reveals their interconnections and differences; second, that of identifying the precise grammatical characteristics of each type of structure, in terms that integrate our description into a rigorous theory of noun phrases. The second aim implies that it will not be enough to propose a syntactic analysis: the proposal must also account for why certain patterns are unacceptable. Accordingly, section 2 will address title-extended names like *general Smith* and *il generale Bianchi*, and articulate a structural hypothesis for why the patterns **the general Smith* and **generale Bianchi* are unacceptable; while section 3 will analyze the different structures of name-like expressions exemplified by *Felix the cat* in English (contrasting with **the cat Felix*) and *il gatto Felix* in Italian. Section 4 will place the analyses in context by comparing the constructions examined to apparently similar structure like *Oxford Street* and *via Roma*. The general conclusions are summed up in section 5.

2. Constructions like General Smith

2.1. Non-appositional name modifiers: English vs Italian

A class of common nouns, typically expressing a rank or an institutional function, has the pre-nominal distribution initially illustrated by *general* in (1) for English and *generale* in (2) for Italian:

- (1) a. *General Smith has had a distinguished career.*
 b. * *The general Smith has had a distinguished career.*
 c. *General Smith, you don't understand.*
 d. * *The general Smith, you don't understand.*
 e. *There's a certain general Smith on the phone.*
- (2) Italian
- a. * *Generale Bianchi ha avuto una brillante carriera.*
 general B. has had a distinguished career
- b. *Il generale Bianchi ha avuto una brillante carriera.*
 DEF general B. has had a distinguished career
- c. *Generale Bianchi, lei non capisce.*
 general B. you NEG understand
 'General B., you don't understand.'
- d. * *Il generale Bianchi, lei non capisce.*
 DEF general B. you NEG understand
 'General B., you don't understand.'
- e. *C'è un certo generale Bianchi al telefono.*
 PRT is a certain general B. at the phone
 'There's a certain general B. on the phone.'

Examples a., b., and c. illustrate the key contrast: the English version cannot feature a definite article, the Italian one must. In (1d) and (2d) we see that in both languages the pre-nominal title can remain with the name in forms of address, necessarily without article,³ and (1e) and (2e) show that the title can likewise remain attached to the name following the non-specific indefinite determiner 'a certain'.

In addition to displaying the contrasting distribution of the definite article, the data in (1-2) suffice to set apart this construction from a superficially similar apposition. It is obvious that *general Smith* cannot be what is traditionally called a loose apposition like *my sister*, *the city Mayor*: there can be no intonational break between *general* and *Smith*, and the first term cannot by itself identify a referent (for a detailed typology of appositions, see Heringa 2011). Independently of this, and as a less elusive empirical argument, the inclusion of *general* in the vocative form of address, and the possibility to occur after *a certain* mark a contrast with so-called strict appositions like those in (3a) and (4a), where there is no break and one term modifies the other:

- (3) a. *My friend Peter owns a bar.*
 b. * *My friend Peter, welcome!*
- (4) a. *Five-time champion Rob Smith will compete a sixth time.*
 b. * *A certain five-time champion Rob Smith will compete a sixth time.*

The same applies to Italian, modulo the necessary article in the equivalent of (4a):

- (5) Italian
 a. *Il mio amico Piero ha un bar.* (= (3a))
 b. * *Mio amico Piero, benvenuto!* (= (3b))
- (6) Italian
 a. *Il cinque volte campione Rob Smith concorre una sesta volta.* (= (4a))
 b. * *Un certo cinque volte campione Rob Smith concorre una sesta volta.* (= (4b))

A closely related consideration involves (Modern) Greek, which features so-called ‘polydefinites’ like (7), analyzed as close appositions by Lekakou & Szendrői (2012):

- (7) Modern Greek
 a. *ta spitia ta megala* (Lekakou & Szendrői 2012: 110)
 DEF.PL houses DEF.PL big
 ‘The big houses’
 b. *de se ipa oti sinandisa ton Antoniou to filologo,*
 NEG you.GEN say.PST.1SG that meet.PAST.1SG DEF.ACC Antoniou DEF.ACC philologist
ala ton Antoniou to mathimatiko.
 but DEF.ACC Antoniou DEF.ACC mathematician
 ‘I didn’t tell you that I met Antoniou the philologist, but Antoniou the mathematician.’

It is significant that even in this system (which also mandates the definite article in front of personal names) phrases corresponding to *general Smith* feature a single definite article, like in (2):

- (8) Modern Greek
 a. *o strategos Markujiannis*
 DEF.M general Markujiannis
 b. *i adelphi Tereza*
 DEF.F sister Theresa

In sum, our initial examples identify a specific ‘noun + name’ construction, empirically distinct from an apposition, and opposing English to Italian in the use of the definite article.⁴

2.2. The range of pre-name titles: Noun-titles and pure titles

It does not take a broad sample to realize that the lexical items that can possibly replace *general* in the syntactic pattern just illustrated make up a semantically coherent ensemble of terms for positions in an institutional hierarchy:⁵

a fuller discussion, highlighting the interesting fact that *en* is extended to some folk toponyms and folk names for clouds in Balearic).⁶

Although pre-name titles that are not also lexical nouns cannot head noun phrases, some can be appropriate as forms of address without a following name. This however varies lexically: *Sir!* is always acceptable, *Miss!* or *Mister!* only colloquially and in certain contexts. That this is a matter of social convention is made clear by the corresponding terms in closely related languages: *Madame!* in French is self-standing as a vocative, *Frau!* in German is not. In some cases a title can be rescued by an appropriate vocative term, as in *meine Frau* or, in past formal German varieties, *gnädige Frau!* ‘gracious Lady’. But this impinges on the grammar of address forms; what is relevant about nouns in name-modifying function, which are our concern, is that in this capacity they share the distribution of pure titles like *Mister* but unlike them they are otherwise full-fledged lexical nouns – so much so that in vocative function they can be prefixed by titles, as in *mister President!* or, with a noun-title, *comrade general!* What we do not generally see are cases like # *comrade general has just arrived* or # *general president has just arrived*: vocatives can be headed by titles alone, but in argument position a title (whether a pure title or a noun) must precede a proper name.⁷

2.3. ‘General Smith’ as a name

The theoretical interest of the ‘noun-name’ construction we have identified is that it combines properties of names and of nouns.

Like a complex name, *general Smith* appears without a determiner in argument position in English (sentences a-b in (1) and (2)). Also like a name, it is used as a form of address (sentences c-d). The evidence offered by *a certain general Smith* in (1e) is not as straightforward. Of course any suitably count noun can be introduced by *a certain*, but in that context a count noun cannot be followed by a name, unless it forms with the head noun a loose apposition:⁸

- (13) a. * *There’s a certain man John Smith on the phone.*
b. *There’s a certain man, (namely) John Smith, on the phone.*

But if the appositional structural analysis of *general Smith* is ruled out independently by the fact that it cannot account for the use of this phrase as a vocative (see (3) above), then the phrase *general Smith* in *a certain general Smith* can only be distributionally equivalent to a noun, as in *a certain man*, or to a name, as in *a certain Smith*, but not to an apposition combining both. My claim in 2.5, to anticipate, will be that it has the distributional properties of a phrase which does combine both but is not an apposition.⁹

A reviewer insightfully observes that *general Smith* is akin to proper names in a different respect, which impacts on the analysis of its internal structure: it refers rigidly as a whole, even though the pre-name title would appear to be a common noun, with the normal interpretation of a common noun. To see this, consider the examples in (14), suggested by the reviewer (whom I thank for this important observation):

- (14) a. *If general Smith were not a general, he would be more popular in certain circles.*
b. *Se il generale Bianchi non fosse un generale, sarebbe più popolare in certi ambienti.*
(= (14a))

Counterfactual scenarios where the descriptive content of the title is explicitly denied leave the reference of the whole complex phrase unaffected. This means that it is the whole complex phrase that acts as a rigid designator, not the name alone.

There is independent evidence for this conclusion. Predicates like *general* do not apply to an individual throughout its existence, but are temporally restricted (they are true of stages; see 3.1 below). However, a sentence like (15) can be true of the individual described as *general Smith* even when he was not a general:

- (15) *In this picture, a very young general Smith can be seen celebrating his fourth birthday.*

This is further evidence that the reference of *general Smith* is fixed regardless of possible variations in the extension of *general*, not only across worlds but also across times.

The construction illustrated in (15) has a hidden peculiarity, which reveals yet another way in which *general Smith* acts as a name as a whole. The DP *a very young general Smith* clearly means ‘general Smith at a stage when he was very young’. It cannot be interpreted as ‘a very young general called Smith’. This means that the phrase *general Smith* receives the same type of reading as a proper name, like in (16a), where what is indefinite and is modified by the adjective is not an individual but a stage of it (see again 3.1), in contrast with a noun phrase headed by a common noun as in (16c):

- (16) a. *The cast included a young general Smith.*
b. *The cast included a young John Smith.*
c. *The cast included a young man called John Smith.*

A context which maximizes the ‘definiteness effect’ and mandates a non-familiar interpretation for the noun phrase (as expressing a novel discourse referent) brings out clearly the sharp interpretive difference

between a phrase headed by a name and one headed by a common noun; once more, *general Smith* aligns with the name:

- (17) a. *Once upon a time, there was a young man called John Smith.*
b. * *Once upon a time, there was a young John Smith.*
c. * *Once upon a time, there was a general Smith.*

In sum, *general Smith* acts as a rigid name as a whole, not as a combination of a name and a common noun. This does not entail that *general* and all similar pre-name titles should be semantically irrelevant, however. As remarked in the previous section, the descriptive content of *general* is accessible and shapes the interpretation of *general Smith* – so much so that (14) actually presuppose that the referent is indeed a general in this world.

The only possible conclusion, then, is that pre-name titles like *general* are an integral part of a rigid designator along with the name proper (*Smith* in this case), even though they retain the semantic content they have in all other uses. The semantic value of *general Smith* is not a cross between the interpretation of a name and that of a noun: it is, as a whole, that of a name. But this name is semantically complex, and the title has indeed (cf. the previous section) a function akin to that of name modifiers, as in *little John* or *Plinius the Elder*, or to the evaluative suffix in Quine's (1961) example reproduced in (18):

- (18) *Giorgione was so called because of his size.*

Here the content of *-one* is presupposed to be part of what is explicitly stated (*was so called*) to be a name: given that *Giorgione* is a name which contains a connotation of large size, the sentence states that this connotation (presupposed) was motivated by the nature of the individual bearing that name. Like in *general Smith*, the presupposition can turn out to be false, but this has to be expressly stated: *Giorgione* might have been a small man, *Plinius the Elder* might not have been older than *Plinius the Younger* (before the birth of *Plinius the Younger* this was necessarily the case), and *general Smith* might not have been a general, but these descriptions are contentful, and assumed to be appropriate unless otherwise indicated. Whatever the solution offered, the empirical question to account for includes this state of affairs.

2.4. '*General Smith*' as a noun + name construction

The semantic behaviour of *general Smith* as a rigid designator would be entirely expected if this structure was also syntactically a complex

name, like *John Smith*, or more aptly *Black Kettle* (the English version of the name of the Cheyenne chief *Mo'ohstavetoo'o*, according to <www.aaanativearts.com>): this second example features a regularly, compositionally interpreted noun phrase which does not lose its content when put to use as a name (cf. the non-nominal phrase 'berry-seek' cited in 1 above; Acquaviva 2019 further mentions *coi-baffi* and *senza-baffi*, 'with-moustache' and 'without-moustache', as transparent descriptions turned into names in Italian narrative fiction). However, *general Smith* does not have the properties of such complex names.

The oddness of a metalinguistic characterization like in (19) probably does not carry much convincing weight:

- (19) a. # *The name 'general Smith' is widespread.*
b. # *'General Smith' is a funny name.*

Still, this simple fact would be in need of explanation, if one insisted on analyzing the structure as a single complex name.¹⁰ But the fact becomes much more important when considered in tandem with another observation: the title *general* cannot routinely be included alongside the name in naming constructions, as (20) shows (in these cases, I use the diacritic # to signal an anomaly in the reading intended; of course grammar does not rule out the existence of a real name *General Smith*, but that would not have the linguistic properties we are reviewing).

- (20) a. *My name is (#general) Smith.*
b. *He was named (#general) Smith.*

English partly obscures this important fact, because it lacks verbs specifically connecting an argument to a name, like for example the German *heissen* or the French *s'appeler* (see Matushansky 2008 for discussion). So, it may be objected that the sequence on question is acceptable in sentences like (21a); but these predicates allow for complements that clearly are not names, as (21b) shows:

- (21) a. *He was known as general Smith.*
b. *He was known as a safe pair of hands.*

By contrast, the sequence in question does not fit a naming predicate in French or Italian, regardless of whether an article is present:

- (22) French
a. # *Il s'appelait (le) général Dupont.*
b. # *Si chiamava (il) generale Bianchi.*

The comparison with Romance languages brings out the most important difference with names. Italian is known to allow the definite article in front of person names in restricted circumstances: with female names (*la Giovanna*), especially when public figures (*la Callas*), and with masculine forenames in familiar registers of North-Western varieties (*il Gigi*). In addition, although this is not generally mentioned, the bureaucratic register typical of police reports routinely prefixes a definite article to surnames for males (*il Bianchi*). The article, crucially, is optional in all these uses; its absence may cause a stylistic shift, but never unacceptability. Omitting it in front of *generale Bianchi*, by contrast, brings about the same sharp unacceptability as with common nouns. This was shown in (2) above, here repeated; I add a French version in (23):

(2) Italian

- a. * *Generale Bianchi ha avuto una brillante carriera.*
 general B. has had a distinguished career
- b. *Il generale Bianchi ha avuto una brillante carriera.*
 DEF general B. has had a distinguished career

(23) French

- a. * *Général Dupont a eu une carrière distinguée.* (= (2))
- b. *Le général Dupont a eu une carrière distinguée.*

The evidence from French is crucial, because here there is no optionality at play. Names cannot have the article, while nouns must have it: and *général Dupont* follows the latter.

Pluralization confirms the same conclusion from a different angle. Names can of course be pluralized or quantified, and this fact has been a cornerstone of descriptivist approaches to the semantics of names (analyzed as definite descriptions) since Burge (1973):

- (24) a. *Every Clarence I meet looks the same.*
 b. *I have four Sarahs in my class.*

If a name is complex (multi-word and/or with internal semantic structure) but is still a syntactic atom, if it pluralizable at all it is pluralized according to the grammar of the relevant language: two people called 'John Smith' are unambiguously *two John Smiths*. But *general Smith* behaves differently:

- (25) *The two Generals Smith were considered the leading experts in amphibious warfare.*
 (Thomas McKelvey Cleaver, 2016, *The Frozen Chosen*, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, p. 98)

Here it is the title which acts as the head of the complex, for mor-

phological purposes. And this is not a minor quirk of English inflection, because the same happens in another type of structure which even more dramatically reveals the syntactically complex nature of this construction. Two surname elements can be conjoined under a single title, much like two singular nouns can be conjoined under a determiner (*the man and woman were arrested*). What is significant is that the title gets pluralized:¹¹

- (26) a. *Generals Smith and Clark will lead the offensive.*
b. *I generali Bianchi e Rossi condurranno l'offensiva.*

- (27) * *John Smith and Taylor are both registered to this course.* (intended: 'J.S. and J.T.')

The difference with names is here a glaring one, and the pattern shown in (24) makes full sense in this context. In all these respects, *general* acts just like a common noun – and it is also interpreted as such, even though its semantic content is irrelevant in determining the identity of the individual, as we saw in the previous section. From the purely syntactic viewpoint, the only difference between *general* used as a title and *general* as a routine common noun arises in English, and it is that the singular phrase *general Smith* cannot be preceded by an article (when it refers to a single individual). Yet there are singular nouns that can occur without a determiner: mass nouns like *gold*, not only for concrete substances but also for abstract concepts like *love*; and we should not forget article-less uses of count nouns that resemble quite closely the title + name constructions we have considered, namely cases like *company A* or *route 76*. If a coherent grammatical interpretation can be proposed that analyzes *general* in *general Smith* in a way parallel to these article-less singular nouns (as I will propose in the next section), the last exception would be removed from the simple descriptive statement that *general Smith* is semantically a single (albeit complex) name but for all morphological and syntactic purposes it is headed by a common noun.

We have thus reached a puzzling descriptive conclusion: the construction *general Smith* has properties both of names and of nouns, yet it is not an apposition in which a noun modifies a name. The pattern of clear acceptability and especially unacceptability shows that this is not a grey area in speakers' competence, or a fuzzy intermediate stage in a hypothetical continuum (along what dimension?) between noun and name.

That is not the end of the explanandum. If possible, an analysis of the puzzling acceptability pattern just reviewed should also account for the crosslinguistic divide illustrated in 2.1: this means not just offering


an analysis of *general Smith* as opposed to **the general Smith*, but also of *il generale Bianchi* as opposed to **generale Bianchi*.

2.5. A syntactic analysis

General Smith acts like a name in denoting a single individual whose identity is not established by one constituent alone (as in a loose apposition), but by both. On the other hand it is equivalent to a noun in its external syntactic behaviour, except in one respect: the obligatory lack of determiner in English. The last qualification is particularly important, since both the Italian *il generale Bianchi* and the French *le général Dupont* behave exactly like common nouns in requiring the article. In fact, and this is the key observation, the English version too follows a pattern followed by common nouns: that of nouns like *philosophy*, *love*, or even *water* in a certain reading.

To make explicit these observations, we can first of all exclude that the title and the name are coordinated. They do not behave either like a double-barrelled name, or as a name with a noun adjoined to it as an apposition (including strict appositions like *singer Joan Baez*). The structural relation I suggest is instead a subordinating one, with the title acting as a type of classifier element which specifies the nature of the referent denoted by the whole noun phrase. *General* is in this sense a noun classifier, as opposed to a numeral or counting classifier. A first rough structure, to be refined directly, is given in (28):

(28)




The choice of what can act as a classifier is lexically restricted; as the languages in question lack grammatical classifiers and do not typically construct noun phrases in this fashion, lexical nouns are recruited, a common enough state of affairs.¹² The resulting CL + N complex is

not a complex name, but a categorized name: not a single syntactic head which has internal structure, but a subordinating structure where a ‘core’ name is embedded inside a categorizing projection headed by a lexical noun which acts like a noun (not numeral) classifier.

There is a major difference between the function of titles like *general* and that of classifiers proper: both categorize the denotation of the DPs, but titles do not label one of the classes of beings that grammar is sensitive to, like ‘human’ or ‘vegetables’, nor a culturally / perceptually salient feature like ‘oblong’. It simply adds a culturally relevant characterization to a proper name, and is in no sense a parameter of unity. At its most bleached, a pre-name classifier in this sense may only signal pragmatic distance (as a sort of honorific class), and/or classify the referent as belonging to a class such as humans, or male or female humans, or similar (note that the Catalan *en* attaches to person names but, in some dialects, also to non-human placenames and even names for clouds, which would appear to be types rather than tokens; see Reina 2014). It is important, then, to fine-tune the structure in (28) and identify the ‘CL’ morpheme more precisely as the innermost, noun-local variant of classifiers among the three types identified by the rich literature discussed by Svenonius (2008). In particular, the attachment site of this type of classifier is lower than the area that determines the internal structure of the denotation – countability and number.

(29)



This accounts for the fact that *general* is freely pluralizable, exactly as a common noun, even when it contributes to making up a name, as we saw in (25-26) above.

2.6. Names and nouns in DP: Determiners and kind-level denotation

Since Longobardi (1994) it is generally accepted that names in Italian, but not in English, get spelled out in the position of the determiner, structurally higher than the position where they are inserted in the syntactic structure, and where they are also realized in English. What triggers this ‘movement-to-D’, however, must be a requirement on the determiner position (when interpreted according to the proper name reading), not on the name itself, because even in Italian structures like *il Giovanni* or *la nostra Anna* show that the name may stay in a lower position if an article in D is compatible with the name interpretation of DP. For this reason, the question we face is not why *Bianchi* has not moved to D in (29); it is rather what accounts for the distribution of the article.

For Italian, the key observation is that the addition of a categorizing noun in noun-classifier position turns the name into a grammatical object that has the syntactic (not semantic) properties of a common noun. The uniqueness and presupposed existence typical of a proper name interpretation for the DP are unsurprisingly expressed by the definite article. What must be underscored in this connection is that the article is not an instance of the so-called expletive article in *la Giovanna*, because it is not optional.

For English, the question is why the article is excluded precisely in this construction (but not in appositions like *the famous general Smith*, or *Smith, the famous general*), given the previous conclusion that *general Smith* is syntactically a noun and not a name (and so the reason cannot be the impossibility of **the Smith*). The answer I propose is that *general Smith* belongs with several other types of DPs which are determinerless in English but obligatorily carry the definite article in Romance (not only in Italian):¹³

- | | | | |
|---------|---|---------------------------------|-----------------------|
| (30) a. | <i>(*The) love / wealth / honesty</i> | <i>is important.</i> | (abstractions) |
| b. | <i>(*The) philosophy / dancing / hockey</i> | <i>is not for everybody.</i> | (disciplines, sports) |
| c. | <i>(*The) French / Russian / Pig Latin</i> | <i>is a beautiful language.</i> | (languages) |
| d. | <i>(*The) seven / three / thirteen</i> | <i>is an odd number.</i> | (numbers) |
| e. | <i>(*The) water / timber / tungsten</i> | <i>is no longer abundant.</i> | (substances) |

The star marks unacceptability for the generic reading exemplified in the sentences above. This must be noted, for the definite article can appear on some of these nouns if their semantics allows a different reading, like *the water contained in this cup* (true of a concrete bounded quantity and not of the substance as a whole). So, what rules out the definite article is not the choice of a lexical item but of a particular reading it determines for the DP.

The reading in question in (30) is that of a whole without internal parts: this is what ties together abstract notions, denominations for institutionalized activities and study, language names, numbers (basic ones like *three* and complex ones like *thirteen*, but not *hundred*), and mass nouns. In particular, mass nouns like *water* are conceptualized as indivisible abstract individuals in their kind reading. The parallel between this reading of mass nouns (*water is indispensable*), bare plurals of count nouns (*bears are mammals*), and proper names was already pointed out by Carlson (1980), who approached the objects denoted by these terms as kind-level individuals. This insight, and the empirical similarities it was based on, remains valid even though subsequent literature sidetracked this aspect and focussed more on kinds as secondary abstract entities arising from generalizations over individuals. But the original conception of a kind as an abstract unitary individual, related to its multiple instances but not reduced to them, is the one that captures the relationship between denotations as diverse as those listed in (30). The proposal being advanced here is that *general Smith* identifies such a unitary abstract individual, much as a name would do, but without having the syntactic/distributional properties of the name it incorporates (*Smith*). In a way, *general Smith* is a name in the sense in which *bears* can also be construed as a name, in Carlson's (1980) analysis: both denote rigidly an abstract entity, and identify its concrete instances, and both involve a larger structure than a double-barrelled name.

In Italian, as stated, the article is mandatory in all these constructions

(31) Italian

- | | | | |
|----|--|-----------------------|-----------|
| a. | *(<i>L'</i>) <i>amore</i> / *(<i>la</i>) <i>ricchezza</i> / *(<i>l'</i>) <i>onestà</i> | è importante. | (= (30)) |
| b. | *(<i>La</i>) <i>filosofia</i> / *(<i>la</i>) <i>danza</i> / *(<i>l'</i>) <i>hockey</i> | non è per tutti. | |
| c. | *(<i>Il</i>) <i>francese</i> / *(<i>il</i>) <i>russo</i> / *(<i>il</i>) <i>Pig Latin</i> | è una bella lingua. | |
| d. | *(<i>Il</i>) <i>sette</i> / *(<i>il</i>) <i>tre</i> / *(<i>il</i>) <i>tredici</i> | è un numero dispari. | |
| e. | *(<i>L'</i>) <i>acqua</i> / *(<i>il</i>) <i>legno</i> / *(<i>il</i>) <i>tungsteno</i> | non è più abbondante. | |

As noted, it is crucial that French patterns like Italian, in view of the fact that French as a rule does not prefix an article to (personal) names, and yet just like Italian it requires the article in front of a titled name:

(32) French

- | | | | |
|----|--|-----------------------|-----------------|
| a. | *(<i>L'</i>) <i>amour</i> / *(<i>la</i>) <i>richesse</i> / *(<i>l'</i>) <i>honnêteté</i> | est importante. | (= (30), (31)) |
| b. | *(<i>La</i>) <i>philosophie</i> / *(<i>la</i>) <i>danse</i> / *(<i>l'</i>) <i>hockey</i> | n'est pas pour tous. | |
| c. | *(<i>Le</i>) <i>français</i> / *(<i>le</i>) <i>russe</i> / *(<i>le</i>) <i>Pig Latin</i> | est une belle langue. | |
| d. | *(<i>Le</i>) <i>sept</i> / *(<i>le</i>) <i>trois</i> / *(<i>le</i>) <i>treize</i> | est un nombre impair. | |
| e. | *(<i>L'</i>) <i>eau</i> / *(<i>le</i>) <i>bois</i> / *(<i>le</i>) <i>tungstène</i> | n'est plus abondant. | |

- (33) a. *(*Le*) *Pierre*.
 b. *(*Le*) *général Dupont*.

To summarize: the difference between English and Italian in the use of the definite article in *general Smith* is part of a more general pattern, where Italian sides with French even though the two differ in their use of articles before names. This shows that such titled names do not have the syntax of names, but that of a series of nouns denoting internally undifferentiated notions, mostly abstract. The notion of kind as an abstract individual allows us to capture the fact that this behaviour of titled names is a facet of a more general phenomenon.

2.7. Names and nouns in DP: Syntactic complexity and direct reference

The structural sketch in (29) deliberately does not distinguish nouns from names. The reason is that I assume, in line with most work on the grammatical representation of proper names since Longobardi (1994) (developing an insight going back to Burge 1973), that names are generated in the same position as common nouns and acquire their distinctive rigid interpretation through a grammatically represented link to the D position. There are in effect two senses of ‘name’: one for the expression used in this capacity (*John, Ivan 4th the Terrible, Anna Petrovna Maslova*), and one for such an expression in a particular context of use, interpretively specified as referring to one discourse referent. Castañeda (1985: 110) articulated in an original way the insight that naming expressions (names in the first sense just given) do not yet refer to any individual but merely label a type of entities, which will be given a specific reference value in a context of use:¹⁴

The sentence ‘Vladimir loves Tatiana’ is, therefore, merely the formulation of a propositional form x loves y , where the variables ‘ x ’ and ‘ y ’ are governed by the rule that their instances or *values* come, respectively, from the nominal sorts being named “Vladimir” and “Tatiana”. Such values are individual slices in the worlds of the different parties in the act of communication [.]

The approach I follow implements this insight by analyzing D as the grammatical locus which provides such name-labels (the first of the two senses just distinguished) with a specific, context-determined, value as a discourse referent. The presence of a title, syntactically analyzed as in (29), affects the syntactic properties of the construction: the DP’s external syntax is now determined by the title/classifier, whose distribution is that of mass or abstract singular terms in a kind reading (see directly below), and as such takes no determiner in English but an obligatory definite article in French or Italian. Correspondingly, the sequence *general Smith* is not equivalent to a name in the strict sense (‘proper

noun', in the terminology mentioned in note 3) in cases like (19-20), here repeated:

- (19) a. # *The name 'general Smith' is widespread.*
b. # *'General Smith' is a funny name.*
- (20) a. *My name is (#general) Smith.*
b. *He was named (#general) Smith.*

The semantics of the whole DP, however, remains that of a rigidly-denoting name. Titled names, then, are syntactically complex rigid designators, similar to phrases such as *camera sua* 'his room' (with noun-possessive inversion signalling that the noun raised to D, after Longobardi 1994). The parallel, of course, lies in the syntactic complexity, not in the distribution of determiners.

3. Constructions like *Felix the cat*

3.1. *The main facts and the main question*

The paradigm in (34) illustrates a different way in which a noun categorizes a name:

- (34) a. *Felix the cat / Billy the bear*
b. *Dennis the Menace / Billy the Kid / Henry the Lion / Henry the Bird-catcher*
c. *Bill and Ben the flowerpot men*
d. * *The cat Felix*
e. # *Smith the general / president / teacher*

The structure '*[name] the [noun]*' is typically associated with names given to animals, as in (34a), but the same linear order is also attested in nicknames both for comics characters and for historical figures, as in (34b). The nouns can be pluralized, to agree with a conjunction of names (see (34c), a real example like (34a-b)). As we saw in section 2, the alternative '*the [noun] [name]*' is excluded with nouns like *cat*, by contrast with what we saw in the preceding section for *general*; other nouns like *teacher* are excluded in both (see (34d,e)); the diacritic # signals semantic anomaly, which allows for a grammatical structure but only with a more or less bizarre interpretation. Intuitively, but not necessarily incorrectly, the reason why designations for animals seem so natural is that the noun in this construction categorizes the referent of the DP as an individual-level predicate, intrinsically true of the referent throughout its career in time (Kratzer 1995). Being a general or a

teacher are instead properties of an individual at some stage, and only the former noun appears to qualify (in English and similar languages) as a title. The deviance of (34e) is not strictly speaking a fact of grammar (a context may be conjured up for something like *Milly the nurse*, heard by the author); the fact that this structure imposes an individual-level reading is.

The comparison with Italian this time reveals a deeper asymmetry. The structure '[name] the [noun]' exists, as in (35a-b), and corresponds routinely to appositional nicknames like those in (34b); but the phrase corresponding to *Felix the cat* (and similar, with an individual qualified as an animal species) is in fact '*the [noun] [name]*' as in (35d), with the structure of the English unacceptable (34d):

(35) Italian

- a. *Felix il gatto / Billy l'orso*
- b. *Enrico l'uccellatore / Enrico il leone*
- c. * *Felix e Tubby i gatti (furbi)*
- d. *Il gatto Felix*
- e. # *Bianchi il generale / il presidente / l'insegnante*

The unacceptability of the plural in (35c) could conceivably be stretched to acceptability with a clear loose appositional reading and a more informationally heavy second element (cf. *A e B, i famosi gatti ciclisti* 'A and B, the famous cycling cats'); but in no way can it simply act as the plural variant of the bare naming-classifying label like (35d), which is the real counterpart to (34a). Finally, no difference emerges between (34e) and its translations in (35e).

The clear intuition that *Felix the cat* translates as *il gatto Felix* rather than as the isomorphic *Felix il gatto* calls for some clarification about the difference between (34a) and (34b). Two aspects stand out. First, *Felix the cat* is classificatory in the sense that the predicate *cat* is interpreted literally as the species which *Felix* instantiates, while in (34b) Henry is only metaphorically a lion (see Ursini 2016a for metaphor resolution in appositions). Secondly, the classificatory reading of (34a) requires a noun like *cat* in the definite description acting as second element, but the looser appositional (34b) freely admits an adjective, because any property may be called upon as characterizing the referent identified by the name: *Richard the lion-hearted*, *Olav the sensible*, *Inga the not-so-nice*. In a way, then, *Felix the cat* resembles *general Smith* in that the whole construction identifies a referent. And in this sense, the Italian counterpart of *Felix the cat* is only *il gatto Felix*. The question, then, is why this should be the case.

3.2. Compound names and a directional asymmetry

In both *Felix the cat* and *il gatto Felix*, the noun appears preceded by the definite article, and what differs in the linear placement of the name with respect to this definite DP. A formulation in these terms makes it easier to notice that the same asymmetry holds of a minimally but crucially different type of modified names, namely those like *Mickey Mouse*. Just as in *Felix the cat*, here too English places the name on the left and the noun on the right, while Italian does the opposite. What is more relevant, the Italian pattern is again replicated in other Romance languages; (36) and (37) illustrate the two patterns, with common nouns (denoting a type of animal) underlined for clarity:¹⁵

- (36) English
Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, Bugs Bunny, Peppa Pig, Yogi Bear, Huckleberry Hound
- (37) a. Italian
Topo Gigio, Gatto Silvestro, Lupo Alberto
b. Spanish
Ratón Miguelito, Ratón Mickey, Pato Donald
c. Romanian
*Rățã Donald*¹⁶


All items listed in (36-37) have unambiguously the grammatical behaviour of names: they all lack an article, do not admit pluralization under any circumstances (**Mickey and Minnie Mice*), and can occur as internal arguments of naming predicates (*si chiama Topo Gigio* ‘his name is T.G.’). Even so, the noun keeps its own semantic content, and indeed must be interpreted literally, much as in *Felix the cat*. The two constructions are different but related.

The consistent alignment of name-noun order in the two constructions, and the way it changes across languages, suggests an interpretation in terms of compounds (see Lieber and Štekauer 2011 for a comprehensive introduction to the extensive literature). English (Germanic) and Italian (Romance) are independently known to differ in the headedness of compounds: the head, when present, is on the right in English (a *driveway* is a noun and a type of ‘way’, not of ‘drive’) but left in Romance (cf. Italian *uomo-rana* vs English *frog-man*, both descriptions denoting men and not frogs). I accordingly analyze *Mickey Mouse* and *Topo Gigio* as compounds, headed respectively by *mouse* and *topo*. Semantic headedness does not have a particularly strong semantic impact on a name, so there are no visible consequences of this interpretation for *Mickey Mouse* except for the entailment that it must be a mouse, literally and not in a figurative sense (contrast *Henry the Lion*).

Phrases like *Felix the cat* are more complex and involve a definite article, but the headedness parameter might give us a handle in explaining the basic word-order asymmetry between English and Italian, given that in both types of construction English displays the name on the left (*Felix the cat*, *Daffy Duck*) and Italian and Romance on the right (*il gatto Felix*, *Topo Gigio*).


My hypothesis of solution posits an invariant structure [N DP] in both languages for this type of construction, with a full DP adjoined to N. This is not a compound noun, because it contains a phrasal constituent; but it is not a loose apposition either, where an independently referential name is further characterized by a description:

(38)




Suppose the noun and the name (in the ‘strict’ sense of name elucidated in 2.7 above, that is, not a full DP) realize the two N nodes. In keeping with the consensus view since Longobardi (1994), the name must be related to a definite D position in order to be interpreted as an argument, even though opinions differ on the precise semantic value of the name and of the determiner. This implies two things: that a name filling the higher N node must itself be related to a definite D, and that the content of the two Ds must be compatible if the whole is to be interpreted as something like a complex name. So, regardless of where the name appears in it, the structure in (38) must be further specified as in (39):

(39)



All we need to hypothesize at this point is that the English and Italian constructions spell out this invariant template and differ only in the relative placement of the noun and the name. I notate as *THE* (after Elbourne 2005) the silent definite operator hosted on the D governing a name in English; as for Italian, I assume that the name *Felix* has raised to D from the most embedded N position (this is actually immaterial, because if there were reasons to think the name does not raise then the silent D would be the same *THE* as in English):

(40)



An overt determiner in **the Felix (the) cat* in English is unacceptable for the same reason why **the Paul* is. The noun must in both cases be specified by a definite determiner, which I assume does not clash with the content of D when this governs a name. Given the adjunction structure, there is in fact only one discourse referent, determined by D in two places corresponding to the two N positions. The whole DP should end up interpreted as in (41), that is, the existing and unique x that is identical to Felix and is a cat:

(41) $\iota x: (x = \text{Felix}) \ \& \ \text{cat}'(x)$

A detailed semantic analysis should no doubt further clarify how the two definite operators can be compositionally interpreted as one, but this in turn hinges on whether the name (just the word spelling out N, not the whole DP complex) denotes a predicate or an individual. Following the ramifications of this age-old debate would bring us very far from the present focus, however, which is the syntactic structure

underlying the two constructions. Note in any case that in itself the presence of a definite determiner in construction with a name, mandated by an extra element in DP, is nothing new. Something very similar to the semantics in (41), or indeed the very same interpretive format, is implied by the content of (42b), where the non-restrictive reading of the adjective means that DP has the denotation associated with the name and D plus the content encapsulated by the adjective:

- (42) a. *The winner is (*the) Laura Byrne.*
b. *The winner is *(the) usual Laura Byrne.*

Importantly, the spelled-out determiner here does not have the effect of shifting the denotation of the name to a stage, as it would in a *young Laura Byrne* (true of a temporal slice of the time during which the individual exists). The interpretation of *usual* certainly requires a precise analysis, but the point here is that it mandates the presence of *the* even though it does not modify the interpretation of *Laura Byrne* with respect to (42a). Exactly the same happens with *Felix* if (40) and (41) are correct; in fact, the same happens also with *il generale Bianchi*, where the obligatory article introduces an expression interpreted as a rigid designator (see section 2). Having said that, I must concede that my proposal does not suggest a straightforward way to derive the reading in (41) from the structure in (40). This is a limitation in the analysis; but is not a counterargument, because it does not point to inadequacies or conceptual problems in the derivation of the empirical pattern in (34-35) from the structures in (40).


3.3. Extensions, implications and differences

One important consequence of the solution proposed to this problem is that the name acts in both cases as a specification of the noun (*cat, gatto*), which in both cases is the element of the adjoined N-DP structure which determines the properties of the whole DP: the noun is the head of this extended compound, and the head is placed where it is independently known to be, in the DP adjoined to the right of N for English, and in the N on the left in Italian – as well as in other Romance languages: cf. French *l'ours Yogi*, Spanish *el oso Yogui*, Catalan *el ratolí Mickey* (notice that the Catalan form features the article *el*, not the title-article *en* appearing in front of masculine names; this confirms that the whole DP is syntactically a projection of a common noun in Romance).

Another aspect to note is that this analysis provides a natural way to relate the construction in question to the minimally distinct complex names (*Mickey Mouse*) and appositions (*Loulou the dancing louse*). If *Felix*

the cat and *il gatto Felix* realize in different ways the same basic structure [_{DP} D N DP], compound names are best seen as conjunctions of N nodes, dominated by D like all other names when used as arguments. As for appositions, where at least one of the conjuncts is autonomously referential, they arise from the conjunction of two full DPs, one of which suffices to fix the identity of the referent:

(43)



In sum, the asymmetry between *Felix the cat* and *il gatto Felix* is best understood when it is related to the corresponding asymmetry in the make-up of compound names like *Mickey Mouse*.

A broader view also allows us to capture some otherwise hidden differences between the constructions *general Smith*, *Felix the cat*, and *Donald Duck* (with their non-English counterparts).¹⁷ The first concerns their use as address forms. We noted in (1c,d) and (2d,e) the vocative uses of *general Smith* and (also without article, as is the rule for Italian vocatives) of *generale Smith*. However both (44a) and (44b) are clearly less acceptable:

- (44) a. **Felix the cat, where are you?*
 b. **gatto Felix, dove sei?*

The corresponding structures we analyzed as compounds (see (36-37)), on the other hand, seem acceptable:

- (45) a. *Yogi Bear, where are you?*
 b. *Orso Yogi, dove sei?*


The contrast between (44) and (45), which should be more systematically documented, is only partly expected. Insofar as compounds [*N*

NJ (those in (45)) are just names for all syntactic purposes, we expect them to be used as vocatives. But there is no obvious reason why (44) should be as deviant as it is, whether or not its structure is the one depicted in (40) (minus the top D). This seems to point to a privileged relationship of titles with vocative use, as distinct from purely descriptive terms like *cat*. But I cannot do more than note this unexplained circumstance.

A second asymmetry is that, while we easily countenance a scenario where *general Smith* is not a general, it seems much harder to contemplate *Felix the cat* not being a cat without contradiction. This correlates in all likelihood with the fact that titles like *general* are not individual-level predicates like *cat*: if being a cat is an inherent property of the referent so named, temporally coextensive with it, it stands to reason that denying it should have the flavour of a contradiction. But again this is not the complete answer: temporally coextensive does not mean the same as inherent, and surely one can envisage a scenario where my pet dog was not a dog (but, say, a dog-like wolf cub). The syntactic structure, and particularly the presence of an interpreted definite article, must be more directly responsible.

Although these brief notes are not enough to account for these facts, they can facilitate an explanation by providing an explicit hypothesis on the structures of the various constructions. In a broader perspective, they help bring into sharper focus the question about how all of these naming constructions differ from appositional structures.

Appositions fundamentally differ from the constructions we have considered because in an apposition (loose or strict) at least one of the components suffices to identify and refer to a specific referent (see 2.1 above). Recall that under the assumptions we are following, a name comes to denote a specific referent when it is in construction with an interpreted D. Consider now the various constructions so far considered:



The coordination of two referential DPs, on the right, expresses an apposition, while that of two names (in the strict sense of 2.7) brings about a complex name. The other two structures do not feature coordinated constituents, but this does not mean that they have nothing to do with appositions. As a reviewer insightfully suggests, compound names like *Donald Duck* can be viewed as the version of constructions involving name + definite description (*Felix the cat*) where the most embedded noun lacks a DP shell. The proposed structural hypotheses allow us to see the two central structures as related, and varying in the referential autonomy of the right conjunct: a [N-N] compound differs minimally but crucially from a [N-DP] construction, where DP hosts a definite description. Still the two are both subelements of a structure that expresses one single referent: the single D of compound names is matched by two D positions that jointly refer to one referent – not unlike the Ds of coordinated DPs in an apposition. Notice that both in the English- and in the Italian-type structure (cf. (40)) a noun embedded under a definite D is transparently interpreted as in other definite descriptions. Not so for a noun coordinated to a name: here the two merge into a single label, and although the noun still has descriptive content it is only half of a linguistic expression ('coordination' is in fact an imprecise term because it suggests a conjunction 'and'). But notice that the classification of a name under a term like *general* is not too different: under this analysis *general Smith* is a complex classified name, where *general* is not interpreted as a noun bound by D (as it would be in *the general*), but only as part of a complex naming expression. While a rigorous argumentation would require a detailed semantic analysis, the constructions in (46) can at least point to a plausible structural explanation of the similarities and differences between complex names and appositional structures.

4. Some similar constructions

Of course the two sets of expressions analyzed are not the only ones to combine names and nouns: think of patronymics, or of expressions like *HMS Ark Royal*, or (especially) of the manifold variety of place-names. To correctly place our two case studies in the broader context of studies on name structure, one should note that our goal has been to account for the behaviour of the two types of expressions in formal syntactic terms, treating these names like any other nominal construction. It may well be that, as suggested by Anderson (2007) and Helmbrecht (*forthcoming*), names have a grammar of their own; but they are also

part of natural language, especially when they interact with nouns as closely as in the constructions here considered. The analyses proposed aim above all at shedding light on this interaction.


Without attempting an impossible comparison with all other naming constructions that juxtapose nouns and names, some quick notes about the relation of our analysis to other phenomena may be useful. Consider first the treatment of titles like *general* as classifier, in the very specific sense detailed in section 2. A classifier structure for names has been posited by other investigations. In particular, Ursini's (2016b) original analysis of place-names also provides an overview of the research on this type of names and on the reasons for associating a place 'classifier' with them as a default. 'Classifier' has here an extended sense, which includes for instance the morpheme *-ham* in *Notting-ham*. Similarly, but in a different and more abstract sense, Moltmann (2015) (already mentioned) attributes to the lack of an abstract classifier the fact that German place-names (*Berlin*), terms for numbers (*Sieben*), terms for times (*Montag* 'Monday', *1960* '[the year] 1960'), and mass terms as kind names (*Wasser* '[the element] water'), must be resumed by the mass relative pronoun *was* and cannot antecede plural anaphora. This contrasts not only with personal names and with names qualified by a classifier-like count term like *the city*, *the mountain*; it also contrasts with the corresponding terms in English. This points, on the one hand, to a divide between the grammar of different types of names in German, and, on the other, to a crosslinguistic contrast that it would have been quite difficult to diagnose otherwise. The recognition of a classifier as part of the nominal shell that hosts a name obviously marks a parallel with my analysis of *general Smith*; however, in all other respects the phenomena uncovered by Moltmann differ from those discussed here. Her analysis posits a classifier, abstract or realized, as a necessary component of names (especially personal names) for them to qualify as count DPs, otherwise they behave like mass nominals. This is compatible with our results: possibly, *general* in *general Smith* is a rare realization of this classifying element. It remains to be explained what constrains its overt realization and above all under what conditions a name may remain a name but lack such a classifier, as Moltmann argues for certain German terms.

The suggestion of a classifier as an integral part of a name is especially plausible for place-names, as we have seen. One pattern occurring in Italian must be briefly discussed, because it minimally differs from *il generale Bianchi*:

- (47) a. **(Il) generale Bianchi*
b. *(*La) via Roma*
'(The) Roma Street'

Having claimed that *generale* mandates an article and so gives the whole DP the distribution of a common noun, I must explain why *via* fails to do so with *Roma*, given that the article is excluded on (47b) exactly as with any other proper name (and with no possibility of expletive article, being a place-name). The answer lies in the fact that while *Smith*, by itself, can name a person, *Roma* does not autonomously name a street: it names a city, but the street-name recruits this place-name by obligatorily specifying that the place in question is a street (contrast **city Rome*). For these reasons I suggest that *via* ‘street’ is here a classifier only in a semantic sense, not in the sense of occupying the hierarchical position above the noun which qualifies it as a sortal classifier or rather a noun classifier, as depicted in (28). A different interpretation suggests itself in the light of the analysis in section 3: *via Roma* is a compound name, grammatically a compound headed by *via* on the left exactly as *Topo Gigio*. The decisive confirmation comes from a comparison with English, where *Oxford Street* inverts the order, with the head (the descriptive classifier) on the right just as in *Mickey Mouse*.

(48)



Being a name by itself, the complex *via Roma* does not tolerate an article, any more than other place-names like *Roma* do.

5. Conclusions

The results of our case studies are first of all descriptive in nature. I have mapped the cluster of properties that define the two types of extended names illustrated by *general Smith* and *Felix the cat*, including the unacceptability patterns, and we have seen where the English versions of the two differ from the Italian ones. The asymmetry is particularly salient in the second type, something which is initially obscured by the existence of an isomorphic Italian version *Felix il gatto*. This

impression is corrected, however, when closer scrutiny reveals that the isomorphic variants are better seen as appositions where the name alone suffices to completely identify a referent, and the counterpart of *Felix the cat* in a non-appositional, name-like interpretation is *il gatto Felix*.

The cluster of phenomena thus brought to light has then motivated a structural hypothesis for the two construction types. Both English and Italian, in this analysis, use pre-name titles like *general / generale* as a sort of classifier, in the precise sense of noun classifier (not relevant for countability or grammatical number); the crucial effect of this extra layer on top of the name is that the whole structure ends up having the external syntax of a common noun. The English-Italian contrast in the distribution of the article exactly parallels that with abstract kinds introduced by mass terms like *water / acqua*, but also less familiar cases like terms for abstractions, languages, or numbers. Indeed, the generalization summarized in (30) above, and the consistent pattern of crosslinguistic variation opposing English and Romance, is another descriptive result, which deserves being singled out. From this empirical result I drew the conclusion *general Smith* follows the pattern of *love, philosophy, seven, or water* because they are at the appropriate level of analysis varieties of the same type of abstract individual entity. Any competing analysis faces the task of accounting for the syntactic parallelism here noted.

As for *Felix the cat*, the rather different properties of this construction have motivated a different structural analysis. It was especially the ambition of capturing the remarkable syntactic contrast between the two languages that led to the hypothesis of a definite description embedded into another, with English and Italian differing in the relative position of the name and the noun, but not in the (by now almost standard) assumption that the name is related to a determiner position, occupied by a silent operator in English and by the raised name itself in Italian.

It is in the nature of explanatory hypotheses that they branch out involving more phenomena. In our case, the analysis of *Felix the cat* was based on the independently given contrast between English and Italian concerning the position of the head in compounds; this has led to include in the account also the complex names exemplified by *Mickey Mouse*, and secondarily also place-names like *Oxford Street*.

As announced in the introduction, the overarching goal of these detailed case studies on an empirically narrow domain has been to clarify in what sense some complex names are both names and nouns. The structures offered are ways to answer this question: names as interpreted linguistic objects are DPs with a particular semantics, and the addition of nouns inside this structure brings about a well-definable cluster of syntactic and semantic effects. I have attempted to make sense of a

given set of syntactic and semantic facts in this interpretive perspective, in which what is primitive are the grammatical structures, the features they hierarchically organize, and the morphemes that spell them out. Neither ‘noun’ nor ‘name’ is really a primitive. Insofar as this analysis has been successful, the notion of a construct half-way between a name and a noun may be safely put aside for the constructions considered here, because it tells us less than the structural interpretations depicted in (28), (29), (40), (43), and (48).

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank two reviewers, who engaged very constructively with this contribution and significantly improved its quality, and Francesco Ursini for important suggestions. Faults are my responsibility.

Notes

¹ A reviewer rightly points out that this statement should be hedged, in the light of cases like German (*der*) *Irak*. I take it, though, that we are dealing with individual cases rather than patterns; i.e., if speakers tend to prefix an article to personal names, it does not follow that they will do the same with non-personal names. Assuming an expletive article must be part of the explanation, but does not explain this macroscopic type of limitation.

² For each language the question should be addressed whether noun-name sequences like *general Smith* are in fact complex names, for grammatical purposes. A reviewer points out that German, for instance, has both the type *General Schmidt* and *der General Schmidt*, and that the former would appear to be a complex name rather than a noun-name sequence; both Gallmann (1990: 307) and Karnowski & Pafel (2004: 184) analyze titles like *Herr* ‘Mister’ as nominal heads adjoined to the name head; they note however that *Herr* and cases like *Abgeordnete* ‘deputy’ allow or indeed require case inflection, unlike the initial constituents of complex names like *Johann Sebastian Bach*. This circumstance, plus some of the arguments in 2.4, suggests instead that for German as well as for English such pre-name titles are not part of the nominal in the strict sense (‘proper noun’, see note 4), and that the difference is grammatically relevant:

(i) # *Der name ‘Herr Schmidt’*
‘the name ‘Mr Schmidt’’

(ii) *Die (#Frau) Sophie* (in varieties that allow for pre-name article)

(iv) *Die Herren Schmidt und Sommer*
DEF.PL mister.PL Schmidt and Sommer

Note, also, that titles can be stacked, as in *Frau Doktor Schmidt* (thanks to a reviewer for raising the issue). This is compatible with their analysis as name-external classifier elements in section 2, but it depends on language-specific conventions of use.

³ The ban on articles before vocatives is not absolute: French notoriously admits a definite article in (i):

- (i) *Les enfants, descendez!*
 DEF children get_off
 ‘Children, get off!’

However, even French does not tolerate an article in front of a title equivalent to those of (1-2):

- (ii) * *Le général, venez vite!*
 DEF general come quick
 ‘General, come quickly!’

⁴ A convenient terminological innovation (clearly described in Schlücker & Ackermann 2017a) distinguishes the notions of proper name, understood as a whole definite DP with direct reference (like *Jim* and *The Hague*), and proper noun, understood more restrictively as a nominal lexeme specialized in the naming function (*Jim*, but not *The Hague*). I will have occasion to refer to these terms when specifically referring to names in the ‘strict’ sense, which can occur in the context *my name is* _____. Apart from that I will not follow this terminology, however, because the question addressed throughout turns precisely on the delineation of what is ‘proper’ in the complex DP which incorporates the ‘proper noun’.

⁵ I deliberately exclude kinship terms from this rough classification, as they have specific and distinct properties. They can have a rigid name-like interpretation on their own (*mother says* ...); some of them cannot have the syntax of a pre-name title (*mother / sister Mary* cannot be my mother or sister, only a religious); all are inherently relational (*uncle Jim* is someone’s uncle) typically their implicit argument has an indexical character (*uncle Jim* as the speaker’s uncle, or of a salient discourse referent). It is true, though, that some kinship terms overlap with the syntax of titles: *papa John Creach, mother Theresa*.

⁶ Reina’s (2014) contribution traces the historical development that led *en* to become a grammatical marker of proper name status. It is a merit of the crosslinguistic-typological research mentioned in section 1 to have highlighted these ‘onymic’ markers through which grammar identifies proper names as such. The analytic perspective followed here, which asks what in grammar makes a proper name a proper name, is not incompatible with the recognition of a specific ‘onymic’ grammar: however, it aims at identifying its properties through the same general analytic framework used for all other linguistic phenomena. If grammar is sensitive to proper-namehood, then the questions posed by constructions that combine characteristics both of names and of nouns are all the more important.

⁷ ‘Prefixes’ like *H.M.S.* (‘His/Her Majesty’s Ship’) attached in front of names of ships illustrate yet another case, different both from titles which double as nouns (*general*) and from those that cannot act as self-standing nouns (*mister*). Unlike both, they may be used with or without a definite article: *(The) H.M.S. Ark Royal*. It is not too surprising, then, that they also differ in occurring after naming predicates:

- (i) *One of the first British aircraft carriers was named H.M.S. Ark Royal.*

The possibility of being preceded by an article and the occurrence after a naming predicate both show that *H.M.S.* is a subpart of a name, more closely bound to it than *general*. It is not unlike a compound name, parallel to what will be proposed for

place-names like *Oxford Street* in section 4, but with the important difference that *H.M.S.* is not a noun (unlike the word *ship* that gives rise to the acronym) and does not head the compound; correspondingly, it is not on the right.

⁸ The phrase *Man Friday* would suit the context in (13), in contrast with *man Smith*; I take it that this means that the individual phrase *Man Friday* is a name.

⁹ Titles may be modified by an adjective:

- (i) *Capable / pluridecorated / experienced general Smith took up position with his division.*

The existence of determinerless appositions like *singer Joan Baez* (see (4)) means that a string like *capable general Smith*, with the title modified by an adjective, could be an apposition on a par with *capable worker John Smith*. The vocative test once again clears up the matter. Like appositions, modified titles cannot be used as a form of address:

- (ii) * *Experienced worker John Smith, congratulations!*

- (iii) * *Capable general Smith, congratulations!*

Therefore, the construction in (i) is indeed an apposition: the adjective *capable* does not form a complex title with *general*. This is consistent with the conclusion that the sequence ‘title + noun’ is akin to a noun, but also with the weaker conclusion that a title cannot be modified by a restrictor. Of course it can be modified non-restrictively, so that beside *general Smith* we find *brigadier-general Smith*.

¹⁰ Similarly, the claim that *general Smith* is also syntactically a complex name should explain another apparently trivial fact: that it cannot in turn be preceded by a title. If *general Smith* is like *big Jim* or *Black Kettle*, why can we say *brother big Jim* or *chief Black Kettle* but not *# officer general Smith*? Denying titles a syntactic role distinct from that of names carries the burden of accounting for their different syntax.

¹¹ Perhaps less relevantly, titles can also be coordinated in a plural DP: *Mr and Mrs Smith have arrived*. This too is evidence of syntactic complexity, but it is not obvious that all titles are syntactically equivalent; *Mr* and *Mrs* are correlatives of each other, in a way that *general* is not.

¹² See Moltmann (2015) for arguments from German that some names involve a classifier. Her analysis is different and does not directly support the present analysis of titles (which are not her empirical focus); but the convergence remains significant.

¹³ A reviewer notes an asymmetry between expressions like *general Smith* and kind-denoting nouns like *water* or (in my account) *seven*: while *if general Smith were not a general* expresses a perfectly possible counterfactual (see section 2.3), *if water / seven were not water / seven* is plainly contradictory. The two then, so runs the objection, cannot be on a par, and in particular *general Smith* cannot be the same type of kind-denoting nominal. But this overlooks that *if water / seven were not water / seven* negates the totality of the nominal, while *if general Smith were not a general* only negates the information expressed in a part of it. The real comparison should involve *if general Smith were not general Smith*, and this too is contradictory.

An even better way to assess the force of this objection would be to compare *general Smith* with a kind term that has the same complex structure: if negating the first element in both (so, *general* and the kind modifier) still leads to a semantic difference, then the objection is valid. The problem is that a title like *general* has a rather particular relation to the individual named (I gave reasons against analyzing it as a compound), and it is a noun rather than an adjective. So, the fact that *red wine* can fail to be red is not directly conclusive (although it is suggestive). Still, it is possible to compare at least similar complex kind-denoting nominals – and the results again

do not evidence the sharp difference claimed to arise between contradictory and non-contradictory counterfactuals:

- (i) *If [general Smith] were not a general, he would be less pompous.*
- (ii) *If [Dublin Bay prawns] were not from Dublin Bay, they would taste different.*
- (iii) *If [route 65] were not a route, it would still represent the only line of access to that area.*
- (iv) *If [company A] were not a company, it would not be led by a captain or a major.*

Note that, in fact, the crustaceans known as Dublin Bay prawns are not technically prawns and are not fished in Dublin Bay; however, this particular kind term is probably a compound, and in any case the semantic relation between its two constituents is different from that in *general Smith*. On the other hand, examples (iii-iv) seem very similar.

¹⁴ Only the ‘narrow’ name, the nominal itself without D, appears in naming constructions like *we called her Anna*; see Acquaviva (2019).

¹⁵ I am aware of at least one exception to this pattern: the Disney character known in English as *Zeke Midas Wolf* in Italian bears the name *Ezechiele Lupo*, with an exceptional name-noun order.

¹⁶ Some French examples would have been expected, but apparently translation conventions went against names of this ‘name-noun’ format. I have sought (and found) at least one Romanian example, rather than Portuguese which would have been too close to Spanish to illustrate the spread of the Romance pattern (*Rato Mickey*). Another problem is that Romance seems to use much more widely the format with a definite article, as in Portuguese *o pato Donald*, Romanian *Rățoi-ul Daffy* (‘duck-the Daffy’).

¹⁷ These differences were noted by a reviewer, whom I would like to thank for noting these implications of the proposed analysis and also for suggesting the noun-raising hypothesis discussed directly below.

Bibliographical References

- Ackermann, Tanja & Schlücker, Barbara 2017. Morphosyntax and proper names. Special issue of *Folia Linguistica* 51,2.
- Acquaviva, Paolo 2019. Names as kinds: An analysis of naming verbs. Ms., University College Dublin.
- Anderson, John 2007. *The Grammar of Names*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burge, Tyler 1973. Reference and proper names. *Journal of Philosophy* 70. 425-439.
- Carlson, Gregory 1980. *Reference to Kinds in English*. New York: Garland.
- Castañeda, Hector-Neri 1985. The semantics and the causal roles of proper names. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 46,1. 81-113.
- Elbourne, Paul 2005. *Situations and Individuals*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Gallmann, Peter 1990. *Kategoriell komplexe Wortformen*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Helmbrecht, Johannes *forthcoming*. On the form and function of proper names. A typological perspective. *Sprachtypologie und Universalienforschung*.
- Heringa, Hermanus 2011. *Appositive constructions*. PhD Dissertation. Rijksuniversiteit Groningen.
- Kratzer, Angelika 1995. Stage-level and individual-level predicates. In Carlson, Gregory & Pelletier, Francis-J. (eds.), *The Generic Book*. University of Chicago Press. 125-175.
- Kripke, Saul 1980. *Naming and Necessity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

- Ledgeway, Adam 2012. *From Latin to Romance. Morphosyntactic Typology and Change*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lekakou, Marika & Szendrői, Kriszta 2012. Polydefinites in Greek: Ellipsis, close apposition and expletive determiners. *Journal of Linguistics* 48. 107-149.
- Lieber, Rochelle & Štekauer, Pavol (eds.) 2011. *The Oxford Handbook of Compounding*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Longobardi, Giuseppe 1994. Reference and proper names: A theory of N-movement of syntax and Logical Form. *Linguistic Inquiry* 25. 609-665.
- Matushansky, Ora 2008. On the linguistic complexity of proper names. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 21. 573-627.
- Mill, John Stuart 1843. *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*. London: John W. Parker.
- Moltmann, Friederike 2015. Names and the Mass-Count Distinction. Ms., CNRS.
- Karnowski, Pawel & Pafel, Jürgen. 2004. A topological schema for noun phrases in German. In Müller, Gereon; Gunkel, Lutz & Zifoun, Gisela (eds.), *Explorations in Nominal Inflection*. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter. 151-178.
- Quine, Willard van Orman 1961. Reference and modality. In Quine, Willard van Orman (ed.), *From a Logical Point of View*. New York: Harper and Row. 139-157.
- Reina, Javier Caro 2014. The grammaticalization of the terms of address *en* and *na* as onymic markers in Catalan. In Debus, Friedhelm; Heuser, Rita & Nübling, Damaris (eds.), *Linguistik der Familiennamen*. Hildesheim / Zürich / New York: Olms. 175-204
- Schlücker, Barbara & Ackermann, Tanja. 2017. The morphosyntax of proper names: An overview. *Folia Linguistica* 51. 309-339.
- Svenonius, Peter 2008. The position of adjectives and other phrasal modifiers in the decomposition of DP. In McNally, Louise & Kennedy, Christopher (eds.), *Adjectives and Adverbs*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 16-42.
- Ursini, Francesco-Alessio 2016a. Metaphors below the sentence level: The case of appositives. *SKY Journal of Linguistics* 29. 179-196.
- Ursini, Francesco-Alessio 2016b. On the structure of toponyms. In Štekauer, Pavol; Körtvélyessy, Lívyá & Valera, Salvador (eds.), *Word-Formation across the World's Languages*. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 375-393.
- Van Langendock, Willy 2007. *Theory and Typology of Proper Names*. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter.